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Directors: Dr. Xavier Jarque
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Hotelling’s spatial competition model defines a two-stage non-cooperative game in
a duopoly. First, each seller simultaneously chooses a location where to operate on a
segment. Then, each firm simultaneously selects the price it wants to charge for its
products. In the first part of this study, we present in detail this model — announced in
1929 by Harold Hotelling in his seminal paper Stability of Competition — , we identify
its limitations and we introduce a variation using a different transportation cost function
proposed by d’Aspremont et al. in 1979. In addition, we analyse an extension of the
model to a circular market announced in 1979 and known as Salop’s circle model. The
second part of this project is devoted to study the existence of Nash equilibria in games
in which firms do not compete on price but only on location. Particularly, we follow
Fournier and Scarsini (2019). Finally, we briefly touch upon the problem of inefficiency
of Nash equilibria.
Resum
El model de competència espacial de Hotelling defineix un joc no cooperatiu de dues
etapes en un duopoli. En la primera etapa, cada empresa tria simultàniament una ubicació
on localitzar-se en un segment. En la segona, cada venedor selecciona simultàniament el
preu que vol cobrar pels seus productes. A la primera part d’aquest treball, presen-
tem detalladament aquest model — anunciat el 1929 per Harold Hotelling en el seu article
Stability of Competition — , identifiquem les seves limitacions i introdüım una versió mod-
ificada, utilitzant una funció de cost de transport diferent proposada per d’Aspremont et
al. el 1979. A més, també analitzem una extensió del model a un mercat circular anunci-
ada el 1979 i coneguda com a model circular de Salop. La segona part d’aquest projecte
està dedicada a estudiar l’existència d’equilibris Nash en jocs en què les empreses no
competeixen en preus, sinó que només ho fan en localització. En particular, seguim els
arguments de Fournier and Scarsini (2019). Finalment, tractem breument el problema de
la ineficiència dels equilibris de Nash.
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Oligopolies are a type of market structure that has been analysed by leading economic
thinkers throughout history. They are characterized by a few large companies, each
competing for a higher market share. Because the number of competitors is low, each firm
cannot afford to ignore the rivals’ likely actions when deciding its own strategy. This is the
reason why Game Theory — the study of strategic interaction among decision-makers — is
a good tool to better understand the players’ behaviour in this market structure.
Throughout history, the problem of competition amongst two or more firms has been
described as a mathematical model in order to formalize it. Generally, when referring to
oligopoly competition, it is assumed that there is a fixed number of firms producing an
undifferentiated product with constant marginal costs. Firms, which do not cooperate
between each other, compete in order to increase their market share. Since the product is
homogeneous, consumers want to buy the good from the company that offers it at a lower
price. Under these assumptions, we provide below a brief overview of the most relevant
oligopolistic competition models.
Note that the earliest models were introduced before 1944 — when the modern lan-
guage of Game Theory was established by von Neumann and Morgenstern [19] — , and
therefore, many of the notions we know today were not defined yet. However, due to their
relevance, they have been strengthened over the years. This is why, nowadays, we can
explain them using current terminology.
Cournot (1838) [3], describes an economic model in which companies offering an iden-
tical product simultaneously and independently choose a quantity to produce. That is,
quantity supplied is the strategic variable for each firm. Then, the market determines
the price at which the product is sold. According to Cournot, the unique equilibrium
outcome of the market is when all suppliers have the same marginal costs of production,
and the inverse demand function is linear. In addition, he argues that market price is
above the marginal cost.
Bertrand (1883) [1], criticizes Cournot’s model and suggests considering price, rather
than quantity, as the strategy variable. In this case, each firm independently and simulta-
neously decides at which price charges a homogeneous good. Note that the company that
chooses the lowest price serves the entire market. Therefore, firms will decrease prices to
the point they start losing. So, assuming all marginal costs are the same for all firms in
the market, the equilibrium outcome occurs when price equals the marginal costs.
Note that, in both models, only identical and standardized products are considered.
However, in real life, it is challenging to find truly homogeneous products. In fact, even
when goods are physically equal, there are subjective reasons that make products different
from a consumer’s point of view. Within this context, Harold Hotelling, in his seminal
paper Stability of Competition from 1929 [12], introduces duopoly models with differen-
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tiated products. That is, he considers some characteristics that make consumers to buy
certain products even when they are more expensive than other similar options — such
as the store’s proximity, the customer service or the relationship with the seller, among
others.
The most popular model described by Hotelling is the one in which two firms which
sell a homogeneous product compete on location and price in a market represented by a
line segment. Consumers make their buying decision based on transportation costs and
product prices. Hotelling states that, when consumers are uniformly distributed along
the segment, if the cost of transportation is a linear function of the distance travelled,
firms maximize profits when both players locate their stores in the middle of the segment.
In fact, he affirms that a principle of minimum differentiation holds. Fifty years later,
in 1979, d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse [4] analyse Hotelling’s model and show
that the principle of minimum differentiation is not generally true since there is no price
equilibrium solution when the two stores are located too close to each other. In addition,
they present a modified version of Hotelling’s model using quadratic transport costs. In
this case, there is always a price equilibrium solution, but firms maximize profits when
they are as far as possible from each other.
Over time, many different variations of Hotelling’s model have been constructed. The
most remarkable is the one introduced by Salop in 1979 [17], in which consumers are
located along a circle instead of a line. This overcomes the difficulties of the end points
in the original model.
Several variations of the model assume that firms do not compete on price but only
on location. In this case, price is assumed to be the same for all sellers. In real life, these
models apply to shops that sell products the price of which is exogenously determined,
such as pharmacies or newsstands. One of the most renowned papers that follows this
approach is that by Eaton and Lipsey, from 1975 [7]. They adapt Hotelling’s model to a
game with an arbitrary number of players located across different spatial configurations.
In particular, they prove that location games on a circle always admit Nash equilibria,
and the same applies to location games on a segment as long as the number of players is
not 3.
Continuing with the idea of competition based only on sellers’ location, several re-
searches consider that the firms are located on a network. This is the case of Pálvölgyi
[16] and Fournier and Scarsini [10]. Particularly, they study the existence of equilibria in
location games on a graph, given an arbitrary number of players. Specifically, they show
that if the number of players is big enough, there are always Nash equilibria. Further-
more, Fournier and Scarsini add an exhaustive analysis of how efficient these equilibria
are in terms of the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability.
Most of the literature on spatial competition assumes a uniform distribution of con-
sumers. However, in real life, the concentration of households and population are not
equally distributed — density is higher in urban areas, and equally varies from district to
district. In that direction, some investigators analyse games in which the distribution of
consumers over the market is not uniform or symmetric. For example, in 1995, Tabuchi
and Thisse [18], study the equilibrium locations when consumers are concentrated around
a market center.
Hotelling’s model not only is applied to explain competition on sellers’ location, but it
can be extrapolated to explain competition on any other characteristic that distinguishes a
product — the distance between firms represents the difference between product features.
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Note that, in real life, there tends to be multiple features that make products different.
This is the reason why some researchers have extended Hotelling’s original model to
multidimensional spaces. In 1986, Economides [8] studies the analogue of Hotelling’s
model when products are differentiated by two characteristics. In 1998, Irmen and Thisse
[13], propose an n-dimensional differentiation model to factor in all characteristics that
may make products different.
Hotelling’s framework has been used extensively to understand product differentiation
and pricing strategies in competitive settings. However, it has applications in many
different fields, such as political science.
In particular, political competition can be explained by the variations of the Hotelling’s
model in which firms compete only on location. The segment in Hotelling’s original model
represents the political spectrum. Therefore, candidates play the role of sellers and the
voters the role of the consumers. In this case, each voter supports the party that is closest
to his or her political ideology.
In this area, one of the most well-known studies is the thesis of Anthony Downs from
1957 — An Economic Theory of Democracy [6] — that uses Hotelling’s model to explain
some aspects of a two-party system. He supposes that all voters of a country are ordered
on a segment according to their ideology — where the farthest left voter is located on the
left-most extreme and the farthest right voter on the right-most one. Despite the fact
that in this case it is not possible to assume that voters are uniformly distributed, the
analogous result of Hotelling’s model applies: the only real possibility that parties have
to govern is applying centralizing politics, and therefore, using similar electoral programs.
However, when the political system is formed of more than just two parties, they move
to more radical positions.
Note that the above can be used not only to explain party’s ideology, but it can
also be applied to other aspects in politics — such as parties’ thoughts on religion or
independence or abortion rights. So, although the model works well to explain individual
political concepts, it would be a fairer reflection of reality if it was extended to more
dimensions.
Finally, it is important to remark that, when modelling decision-making situations, for
the sake of mathematical simplicity, sometimes several assumptions that move away from
reality are needed — as it happens in the studies explained above. Despite this, the results
of these models help individuals to better understand the problem being addressed — in
this case, the competitive scenarios.
About This Work
The main part of this project is devoted to study the existence of Nash equilibria in
different games in which geographic location is a strategic variable. In Chapter 1, we
outline some basic concepts of Game Theory focused on non-cooperative games that we
use in the following chapters. In Chapter 2 we present Hotelling’s model — of key impor-
tance in our study. We identify its limitations and we introduce the version of Hotelling’s
original model with quadratic transport costs proposed by d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and
Thisse. In Chapter 3 we review an extension of Hotelling’s model to a circular market,
which is known as Salop’s circle model. Chapter 4 focuses on games in which players
compete on location. Particularly, we follow Fournier and Scarsini’s arguments to show
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the existence of equilibria in these location games where the market is represented as a
segment, a star network or a circle. Finally, in Chapter 5, we provide a brief explanation
of the efficiency of Nash equilibria.
Chapter 1
Preliminaries
Game Theory is the mathematical study that analyses optimal decision making in the
context of strategic interaction between agents. The ideas behind Game Theory have ap-
peared multiple times throughout history. However, its modern analysis began with John
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944, when they published their book Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior [19] — which defines the majority of terminology that
is still in use today. Since then, the framework has been continuously strengthened with
the contributions of many developers, most notably that of John Forbes Nash. Nowa-
days, Game Theory is utilised across several sciences — like Economics and, in particular,
Microeconomics — to study decision making processes that involve various entities whose
decisions are influenced by the decisions they expect from others.
In this chapter, the reader will find some basic concepts of Game Theory. We will
follow Gibbons (1992) [11] and Jehle and Reny (2011) [14]. These notions are used in the
next chapters, since they rely in the analysis of behavior of different agents, buyers and
sellers. We hope these notions would help to better understand our study.
1.1 Non-cooperative Games
A non-cooperative game, in terms of Game Theory, is defined to be any situation in
which there is a group of individuals — called players — that individually have to make
a decision from a set of options — known as strategies. By individually, we mean that
no agreement is established between players — that is, each agent acts in his or her self-
interest. The strategies chosen by each player determine the outcome of the game. As-
sociated to each possible outcome there is a collection of numerical payoffs, one for each
player. These payoffs represent the utility that the outcome or result gives to each agent.
We assume these utilities are personal and generally speaking non-comparable across
agents. There are no binding agreements between agents, each one looks after his or her
utility.
We assume that there is a finite number of players n, with n ≥ 2. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be
the set of all players and let i ∈ N denote an arbitrary player. Let Si be the set of strategies
available to player i, which is called strategy space. Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S1×· · ·×Sn = S
denote a strategy profile, where si is the strategy chosen by player i. Let ui : S → R denote
player i’s payoff based on the strategies chosen by all players — that is, ui = ui(s1, . . . , sn).
There are two ways in which games are represented: the normal form and the extensive
5
6 CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARIES
form. Note that any game can be represented in either normal or extensive form, although
for some games one of the two forms is more convenient to analyze.
In this project, we will consider complete and imperfect information games. By imper-
fect, we mean that players are unaware of the actions chosen by other agents. However,
players know who the other players are, their possible strategies and their payoffs. There-
fore, information about other players is complete.
Simultaneous-move games are usually represented by the normal form, which is for-
mally defined as follows.
Definition 1.1. The normal form representation of a game G is described by a triple
G = (N,S, u), where N is the players’ set, S = S1 ×· · · × Sn is the set of strategy
combinations and u = (ui)i∈N is the payoff function.
Whenever the strategy set for any player is finite, a natural way to represent games is
via a table, especially for two players. The cells of the table are the payoff for all players
in any combination of strategies. Let us clarify it through a classic example.
Example 1.1. The Prisoners’ Dilemma. Two individuals are arrested and charged with
a crime. The police have enough evidence to convict them of that crime, so that each
would spend a year in jail given existing sentencing rules. However, the police also suspect
that the two individuals have committed another crime, but they lack hard evidence to
convict them, unless at least one confesses. To force them to speak, the suspects are
separated and advised of their options. If both claim they are innocent of the second
crime, each of them gets only one year of prison. If both of them confess, they both go to
prison for 6 years. But if one of them accuses the other, whilst the other claims he or she
is innocent, the first one gets immunity while the second is sentenced 9 years in prison.
In the situation above, there are two players (the two prisoners) and each one has two
strategies available: to confess or to not confess. The payoffs for the two players when
a particular pair of strategies is chosen are given in the appropriate cell of the following
table:
1/2 Confess Not Confess
Confess (−6,−6) (0,−9)
Not Confess (−9, 0) (−1,−1)
Each row corresponds to a possible action for prisoner 1, each column corresponds to
a possible action for prisoner 2, and each cell corresponds to one of the possible payoffs
(within each payoff pair, the first one corresponds to prisoner 1 and the second to prisoner
2).
Observe that if each prisoner thinks about his or her own benefit, the best payoff is
when he or she confesses and the other prisoner remains silent. On the other hand, if
prisoners seek the best outcome as a group, the best they can do is to not confess.
1.2 Nash Equilibrium
The concept of Nash equilibrium was introduced in 1951 by John F. Nash (see [15]) as
a generalized solution to n−players game.
1.3. SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM 7
Informally, a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, . . . , s
∗
n) and its corresponding payoffs represent a
Nash equilibrium if no player can increase his or her payoff by changing his or her strategy,
as long as the other players keep their strategies unchanged. That is, if no player has the
incentive to deviate from their chosen strategy. Formally, the Nash equilibrium is defined
as follows.
Definition 1.2. Given a normal form game G = (N,S, u), a strategy profile s∗ =
(s∗1, . . . , s
∗
n) ∈ S1 ×· · · × Sn is a Nash equilibrium of G if for each player i ∈ N,
ui(s
∗






i+1, . . . , s
∗
n) ≥ ui(s∗1, . . . , s∗i−1, si, s∗i+1, . . . , s∗n),
for all si ∈ Si.
Notice that the number of Nash equilibria in a game depends on the characteristics of
each game. In fact, there are games without any Nash equilibrium and others that have
an infinite amount.
Strictly speaking, the above concept is called pure Nash equilibrium because each
agent plays one of the available strategies from his or her strategy space — this concept is
known as pure strategy. That is, a player i chooses a strategy defined on Si. It is worth
mentioning that playing pure strategies is not the only option — instead, an agent can
play a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over all possible pure strategies.
We refer to this as mixed extension of the game.
Example 1.2. Let us find the Nash equilibrium of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game explained
in Example 1.1. Observe that prisoner 1 spends less time in jail if he or she confesses,
regardless of whether prisoner 2 confesses or remains silent. The analogous situation
applies to prisoner 2. Therefore, if both prisoners confess, there is no incentive for players
to change their strategy. Thus, (Confess, Confess) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game.
It is interesting to remark that the Nash equilibrium of the Prisoners’ Dilemma is not
the best outcome prisoners can get as a group, since if neither of them confesses they get
a better payoff as a pair. However, when both prisoners look after his or her own interest
and confess, they get a worse payoff as a group.
1.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
In this section, we consider games in which players make choices in sequence — we
assume that the moves in all previous stages are known before the next stage begins,
and we allow simultaneous moves within each stage. We should introduce the concept of
subgame — a stage within a game which begins at any point where a player has to make
a decision.
These games are better represented by the extensive form. Let us give an informal
description of this term.
The extensive form representation of a game specifies: (1) the players in the game; (2)
what moves are possible for each player, the order in which they have to play and the
information available to them from others’ previous moves; and (3) the payoffs received
by each player for each possible combination of moves.
Frequently, extensive form games are represented graphically by a tree diagram, in
which each node represents the decision of one of the players, each edge represents a
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possible action, and the leaves represent final outcomes over which player has a utility
function. To represent the knowledge available at each stage we will use the concept
of information set. We will indicate that a collection of decision nodes constitutes an
information set by connecting the nodes by a dotted line. The nodes in an information
set are indistinguishable to the agent, so all have the same set of actions.
Let us explain how to get the normal form representation from extensive form games.
Given a set of players N , a player’s strategy can be defined as the chosen action on each
decision node, or information set, regardless if he or she plays at that node. The total
number of strategies available to a player can be calculated by multiplying the number
of options to choose from on each node. The payoff for each player is shown on the final
nodes. Knowing how to go from extensive to normal form is very useful to analyze Nash
equilibria.
Example 1.3. Consider again the Prisoners’ Dilemma game explained in Example 1.1.



























(−6,−6) (0,−9) (−9, 0) (−1,−1)
Figure 1.1: Prisoners’ Dilemma in extensive form.
Note that we may switch the roles of Prisoner 1 and Prisoner 2, since when they make
a decision they do not know what the other player’s decision is.
Let us formalize definitions of some of the concepts introduced above.
Definition 1.3. The extensive form representation of a game is described by a tuple
Γ = (N,A,X,E, π, α, I, (ui)i∈N ), where:
1. N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players.
2. X is a set of non end nodes, where there is just one initial node, x0.
3. E is a set of end nodes.
4. A is a set of actions, which includes all possible actions that might potentially be
taken at some point in the game. Let A(x) = {a ∈ A | (x, a) ∈ X} denote the set of
actions available to the player whose turn it is to move after the node x ∈ X\{x0}.
5. π is a probability distribution on A(x0) ⊆ A to describe the role of chance in the
game.
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6. α : X\(E ∪ {x0})→ N is a function that indicates whose turn it is at each decision
node in X.
7. I is a partition which divides the set of decision nodes. X\(E ∪ {x0}), into infor-
mation sets. That is, if x and x′ are in the same element of the partition, then
A(x) = A(x′) and α(x) = α(x′).
8. u = (u1, . . . , un), where ui : E → R is the payoff to player i.
Definition 1.4. Given an extensive form game Γ, the subgame of Γ rooted at node x,
Γx, is the restriction of Γ to the descendants of x. Whenever y is a decision node following
x, and z is in the information set containing y, then z also follows x.
Applying the concept of Nash equilibrium on each subgame of an extensive form game,
we get the notion of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Definition 1.5. A strategy profile s is a pure subgame perfect equilibrium of the extensive
form game Γ if s induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of Γ.
Since Γ is in particular its own subgame, every subgame perfect equilibrium is also
a Nash equilibrium. That is, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a refinement of Nash
equilibrium. They use that a rational player, confronted to any stage of the game, will
select only a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, any equilibrium which involves unbelievable
threats should be discarded.
Let us illustrate all the information above with an example.
Example 1.4. There are two firms competing in a single industry. One is currently
producing (the incumbent), and the other is not (the entrant). In a first stage, the
entrant must decide whether to enter the industry or to stay out. The best outcome
for the incumbent is that the entrant stays out of the market. If it happens, the status
quo prevails and the game ends. If the entrant enters, then there is a second stage,
where the two firms simultaneously choose between two competition behaviours: fight or
accommodate.
The best outcome for both firms is when they decide to accommodate each other,
since in this case firms are willing to share the market, causing no change in the market
price. Instead, if both firms decide to fight against the other, a price war arises, and as
a consequence, the market price deceases and both firms lose profits. Finally, if one firm
decides to accommodate its competitor, while the other chooses to fight, the one that
cooperates loses all customers, and so its profits will be null. The firm that chooses to
compete aggressively — even though it gains customers — also will see its profits reduced
because of the costs of the fight.
The extensive form representation of this game (using arbitrary numbers) is depicted
in Figure 1.2.
Strategies for Entrant are given by {(Entry, Accommodate), (Entry, Fight), (Stay Out,
Accommodate), (Stay Out, Fight)}, whereas strategies for Incumbent are {Accommodate,
Entry}.
The part of the game that starts at the node where Incumbent is defines a subgame.
Consider now the subgame as a game in its own right. Observe that it has the same
structure as the Prisoners’ Dilemma but with different payoffs. So, if we apply the Nash


































(10, 10) (8, 0) (0, 8) (−5,−5)
(0, 20)
Figure 1.2: Entry game in extensive form.
equilibrium concept to this subgame as we did before, we get that Accommodate is the
best option for each of the two firms, regardless of what the other player chooses. That is,
(Accommodate, Accommodate) is the Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous move game
that follows entry.
Then, assuming that equilibrium in the subgame is (Accommodate, Accommodate),
Entrant prefers enter the industry, since it gets 10 rather than 0. Therefore, ((Entry,
Accommodate), Accommodate) is the subgame perfect equilibrium, which is unique in
this case.
Finally, we represent this example using the normal form as follows:
Entrant/Incumbent Accommodate Fight
Enter, Accommodate (10, 10) (0, 8)
Enter, Fight (8, 0) (−5,−5)
Stay Out, Accommodate (0, 20) (0, 20)
Stay Out, Fight (0, 20) (0, 20)
In order to determine the Nash equilibria of the representation above, we highlight
in blue the response which leads to the best outcome for Entrant, taking Incumbent’s
strategies as given. The best actions for Incumbent, given what Entrant is doing, are
in green. Therefore, there are 3 Nash equilibria of the game (the payoffs underlined
above). However, ((Stay Out, Accommodate), Fight) and ((Stay Out, Fight), Fight) are
not subgame perfect equilibria because Entrant has no interest in playing Stay Out on
the first node, and so they are not Nash equilibria of the whole game. That is, Stay Out
cannot be considered as a credible threat.
Chapter 2
Hotelling’s Model
Harold Hotelling, in 1929, in his article Stability of Competition (see [12]), argues that
if a seller rises substantially the price of a product, its customers will buy the same product
from competitors. However, if the increase in price is insignificant, many customers will
still prefer to buy from that seller because there are other aspects — such as a store’s
proximity, customer service or product quality, among others — that influence buying
decisions.
In particular, he studies how the location of a store affects the demand for a product.
For that purpose, he formulates a model to help each of the two companies under a
duopoly choose the best location and product prices.
Notice that the original model of Hotelling was developed many years before Game
Theory was established by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, in 1944 [19]. But if we use
Game Theory language, the model can be defined as a two-stage game — first, each seller
simultaneously selects a location where to operate. And then, based on the location of
both stores, each seller simultaneously decides the price to charge. The goal is to find the
location of one store relative to the other which maximizes profits for both brands.
Hotelling uses the backward induction process to solve the model and obtain the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium — first, the equilibrium of the price competition is de-
termined, and then this is used to calculate the profit maximizing location.
In 1979, d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, in their article On Hotelling’s “Stability
in competition” (see [4]), show that Hotelling’s argument is not correct and they present
a slightly modified version of Hotelling’s model for which a different equilibrium exists.
2.1 Original Model
In this section, Hotelling’s original model from 1929 [12] is described. The notation
used for the model will be different from the original one. Nevertheless we state the same
results given in Hotelling’s model.
Let A and B be the two stores. Suppose that they sell a homogeneous good produced
at zero cost. The market is represented by a line segment of length l which, without loss
of generality, can be simplified as l = 1. Then this segment is given by [0, 1]. Let a and
b1 be the length of the segments [0, A] and [0, B], respectively, where A and B are the
1Note that in Hotelling’s original model [12], b is the distance of the segment [B,1].
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location of stores A and B. We suppose, without loss of generality, that seller A is situated





Figure 2.1: Hotelling’s model.
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the line segment. They are represented by
a mass of 1. Each customer buys a single unit of this good per unit of time, irrespective
of its price. In addition, each consumer pays travel cost which is proportional to distance.
Let c(z) = cz ≥ 0 be the cost function, where z is the distance from the consumer
to the seller2, and c > 0 a multiplicative constant. Since the product is homogeneous,
each consumer will buy from the store where he or she can get the good at the lowest
cost — considering both mill price and travel costs.
Let pA and pB denote, respectively, the price of the product of sellers A and B. On
the other hand, qA and qB represent the piece of the market buying the good from seller
A and B, respectively. In other words, the demand of the firms.
We shall recall that there is no production cost. Hence, the profit function of each
seller will be πA = pAqA and πB = pBqB, respectively. So, let’s take a look at the quantity
demanded for each seller — the quantity demanded for seller A is given by consumers for
whom buying from company A is more worthwhile. And the same applies to seller B.
Thus, it is important to know the location of those consumers for whom it is indifferent
to buy from seller A or B. Let x be the location of the indifferent consumer. Obviously,
once the locations of the stores A and B are fixed, the location of the indifferent consumer
depends on the price of each product. In fact, x ∈ [0, 1] will be indifferent if
pA + c|x− a| = pB + c|x− b|.
Depending on the value of pA and pB, three different cases must be studied to determine
the possible locations of x with respect to the location of the stores.
(i) If 0 ≤ x ≤ a, then |x− a| = a− x and |x− b| = b− x. Thus,
pA + c(a− x) = pB + c(b− x)⇒ pA − pB = c(b− a).
When the equality above is reached by some pA and pB, all consumers are indifferent,
so the demand of the market segment [0, a] will be shared equally among sellers A
and B. On the other hand, if the equality is not satisfied, there are no indifferent
customers between [0, a].









And x ∈ (a, b) as long as





< b⇔ 2ac < pB − pA + c(a+ b) < 2bc
⇔ c(a− b) < pB − pA < c(b− a)⇔ |pB − pA| < c(b− a).
2The distance in the line is given by the absolute value of the difference of coordinates.
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So, if some pA and pB satisfy the inequality above, x separates the segment of length
1 in two. Those consumers located to the left of x will buy from seller A, while those
located to the right of x will buy from B. That is, seller A will serve the market
segment [0, x], while seller B will serve the market segment [x, 1].
(iii) If b ≤ x ≤ 1 then |x− a| = x− a and |x− b| = x− b. Thus,
pA + c(x− a) = pB + c(x− b)⇒ pB − pA = c(b− a).
Similarly to case (i), when the equality above is satisfied by some pA and pB, all the
consumers are indifferent, so demand of the market segment [b, 1] will be divided
equally among sellers A and B. Contrarily, there are no indifferent customers between
[b, 1].
With the information above, it is possible to know the share of the market for each seller,
that is, the quantity demanded.
• Firstly, if |pA − pB| < c(b − a), recall case (ii), then demand for firm A is the market
segment [0, x] and demand for firm B is [x, 1], with x given by (2.1). That is,
qA = d(0, a) + d(a, x) = a+ |x− a| = x
qB = d(x, b) + d(b, 1) = |x− b|+ |b− 1| = 1− x,
where x is given by (2.1).
• On the other hand, if |pA − pB| = c(b− a), two cases must be studied:
(a) If pA > pB, then pA − pB = c(b − a), and as it is explained in case (i), the demand
of the market segment [0, a] will be shared equally between sellers A and B, and the








(b) If pA < pB, then pB − pA = c(b− a), and as it is explained in case (iii), the demand
of the market segment [b, 1] will be shared equally between sellers A and B and the








• Finally, if |pA − pB| > c(b− a), another two cases must be considered:
(a) If pA > pB, then pA > pB + c(b− a). So, customers on the market segment [a, b] will
buy from seller B since pB plus the cost of going from firm A to firm B is lower than
pA. Let’s suppose now that customers are located on the market segment [0, a]. In
particular, the customer located on 0 is the one farthest from both stores. Despite
this,
pB + cd(0, b) ≤ pB + cd(0, a) + cd(a, b) = pB + cd(0, a) + c(b− a) < pA + cd(0, a),
and so, customers between [0, a] will buy from seller B too. In a similar way, since
pB + cd(b, 1) ≤ pB + cd(b, a) + cd(a, 1) = pB + c(b− a) + cd(a, 1) < pA + cd(a, 1),
customers between [b, 1] will also buy from seller B. That is,
qA = 0 and qB = 1.
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(b) If pA < pB, then pB > pA + c(b − a) and, using a similar argument to that of the
previous case,
qA = 1 and qB = 0.
With the demand of both firms defined, it is possible to define the profit functions as
follows:
πA(pA, pB) = pAqA =

pA if pA < pB − c(b− a),
1
2




pApB − p2A + cpA(a+ b)
)
if |pA − pB| < c(b− a),
1
2
apA if pA = pB + c(b− a),
0 if pA > pB + c(b− a),
and
πB(pA, pB) = pBqB =

pB if pB < pA − c(b− a),
1
2





pApB − p2B − cpB(a+ b)
)
if |pA − pB| < c(b− a),
1
2
pB(1− b) if pB = pA + c(b− a),
0 if pB > pA + c(b− a).
A particular feature of πA and πB is that they have two discontinuities at the price
where a whole group of buyers is indifferent between the two sellers.
All the information above describes a two-person game with players firm A and firm B,
strategies pA ∈ [0,∞), and pB ∈ [0,∞), and payoff functions given by the profit functions.
Strategy pA of seller A is the best reply against a strategy of seller B when it maximizes
πA(· , pB) on [0,∞) for a given pB. And the same applies to player B. So, the Nash
equilibrium point is a pair (p∗A, p
∗
B) such that p
∗
A is the best reply against p
∗
B and vice
versa. Once the price equilibrium is reached, differentiating respect to variables a and b,
the location maximizing profit will be determined.
Using the backward induction previously explained, Hotelling claimed that the most
profitable location is next to a competitor in the middle of a geographic line. This
tendency of business to cluster is known as the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.
2.2 Against Hotelling’s Conclusion
The paper On Hotelling’s “Stability in competition” [4] aims to prove that the Principle
of Minimum Differentiation is not correct. That is, to show that there is no tendency
for sellers to locate towards the center. Actually, d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse
stated that there is no equilibrium price solution when both sellers are not far enough
from each other, so nothing can be rigorously claimed about the structure of the market.
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Using the same notation as in the previous section, necessary and sufficient conditions
on a and b for such an equilibrium to exist will be fixed. In addition, the equilibrium
points for those locations for which there is price equilibrium will be computed.
Proposition 2.1. For a = b, the unique equilibrium point is given by p∗A = p
∗
B = 0. For
a < b, there is an equilibrium point if and only if,
(2 + a+ b)2 ≥ 12(2 + a− 2b), (2.2)
(4− a− b)2 ≥ 12(1 + 2a− b), (2.3)








(4− a− b). (2.5)
Proof. The case a = b is immediate. When a = b, then both sellers are located at the
same place, so customers will buy the product from the store that offers it at lowest price.
As a consequence, a price war arises due to the tendency to reduce the price. So, the
unique equilibrium point is determined by p∗A = p
∗
B = 0.
Let’s suppose now that a < b. Firstly, it needs to be shown that any equilibrium point
must satisfy the following condition:
|p∗A − p∗B| < c(b− a).
Let (p∗A, p
∗
B) be an equilibrium point. Suppose that |p∗A − p∗B| > c(b − a). Then,
according to the profit functions, the seller who charges the highest price gets a null profit
and so may gain by charging a positive price equal to the charged price of the other. So
there is an incentive for one of the sellers to change its price, and this contradicts the fact
that (p∗A, p
∗
B) is an equilibrium point.
Suppose now that |p∗A − p∗B| = c(b− a), and, for instance, p∗A > p∗B (the opposite case
is analogous), so p∗A − p∗B = c(b − a). If p∗B = 0, then the profit of firm B is zero and so
it would generate a profit by charging less than p∗A. If p
∗
B > 0, since sellers A and B are
sharing equally the demand of the market segment [0, a], two cases may arise. Either B
gets the vast majority of the market and so A, who charges a positive price, can increase
its profit by decreasing slightly its price. Or B gets only a small fraction of the market,
that is, qB = 1 − a2 < 1, and it is then sufficient for B to charge a slightly lower price











B(2−a) = πB(p∗A, p∗B). Both cases contradict the fact that
(p∗A, p
∗





satisfy the condition |p∗A − p∗B| < c(b− a).
Consider now any equilibrium point (p∗A, p
∗
B). Since it is an equilibrium, it is known
that p∗A must maximize πA(pA, p
∗
B) in the open interval (p
∗
B − c(b− a), p∗B + c(b− a)) and
p∗B must maximize πB(p
∗
A, pB) in the open interval (p
∗
A − c(b− a), p∗A + c(b− a)) . Taking
first order conditions, that is, 
∂πA
∂pA
(pA, pB) = 0
∂πB
∂pB
(pA, pB) = 0,
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(pA − c(a+ b)) .
(2.6)









in fact, (2.4) and (2.5) are reached.
To be an equilibrium strategy, p∗A must maximize πA not only in the above interval but
on the whole domain [0,∞), and similarly for p∗B. It only happens on a restricted set of
possible locations. Indeed, given a < b, suppose that pA /∈ (p∗B − c(b− a), p∗B + c(b− a)),
and seller B plays p∗B. Different cases must be studied.
(i) Assume seller B plays p∗B and that pA > p
∗





B) ≥ πA(pA, p∗B),
since this last one is zero. Hence, it will be better for seller A to keep p∗A.
(ii) Suppose that seller B plays p∗B and that pA < p
∗
B − c(b − a). Let ε > 0 such that
pA = p
∗











(2 + a+ b)2 >
c
3
(4 + 2a− 4b− ε).
From the inequality above we get
(2 + a+ b)2 ≥ 12(2 + a− 2b).
Thus, if (2.2) is satisfied, then playing p∗A is also the best option for seller A. By symmetry,
if (2.3) is accomplished, then p∗B is an equilibrium strategy too.
Finally, it remains to check that |p∗A − p∗B| < c(b− a) is verified when (2.2) and (2.3)
are satisfied.









pA if pA <
2c
3
(2 + a− 2b),
1
2
pA(1 + b) if pA =
2c
3
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Note that its quadratic piece — the domain of which is all R— has a unique maximum.
We will see that this maximum is reached when p∗A ∈
(
2c
3 (2 + a− 2b),
2c
3 (2− 2a+ b)
)
. It
happens if ∂πA∂pA (pA, p
∗
B) is positive on the left extreme of the interval and negative on the
right one. Deriving πA(pA, p
∗








(2 + a+ b)− pA
c
. (2.7)








































3 (2 + a− 2b),
2c
3 (2− 2a+ b)
)
.
Notice that if a = 0 and b = 1, that is, if sellers A and B are as far as possible from each
other, (2.8) and (2.9) are satisfied. Furthermore, (2.2) and (2.3) are also accomplished.
Let us study what happens at the points where (2.8) and (2.9) stop being satisfied,
that is, when 5b− a = 2 and 5a− b = 2.
(i) If a = 5b− 2 then, condition (2.2) can be rewritten as follows
(2 + 5b− 2 + b)2 ≥ 1
2
(2 + 5b− 2− 2b)⇔ b ≥ 1.
Since by hypothesis b ≤ 1, it can only be the equality. So, both (2.8) and (2.2) are
satisfied if a ∈ [0, 5b− 2).
(ii) If b = 5a− 2, then condition (2.3) can be rewritten as follows
(4− a− 5a+ 2)2 ≥ 12(1 + 2a− 5a+ 2)⇔ a ≤ 0.
Since by hypothesis a ≥ 0, it can only be the equality. So, both (2.9) and (2.3) are
satisfied if b ∈ [0, 5a− 2).




3 (2 + a− 2b),
2c
3 (2− 2a+ b)
)







B). That is, it is guaranteed that p
∗
A is the best strategy for seller A. By
symmetry, p∗B is the best strategy for seller B.
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According to Proposition 2.1, note that if a 6= b and we consider only symmetric
locations around the center (a = 1 − b or b = 1 − a), then the necessary and sufficient
conditions (2.2) and (2.3) can be rewritten as
(2 + 1− b+ b)2 ≥ 12(2 + 1− b− 2b) ⇒ 9 ≥ 36(1− b) ⇒ b ≥ 3
4
,
(4− a− 1− a)2 ≥ 12(1 + 2a− 1 + a) ⇒ 9 ≥ 36a ⇒ a ≤ 1
4
.
That is, firms A and B cannot be located at the center of the market to achieve equi-
librium in prices. Indeed, the Principle of Minimum Differentation exposed by Hotelling,
as stated, is not correct, except for prices equal to zero.
2.3 Quadratic Transport Costs
In 1979, d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, in their article On Hotelling’s “Stability
in competition” [4], modified Hotelling’s model in order to get a price equilibrium solution
for any pair of locations (a, b). In their version, instead of considering linear transportation
costs, these costs are assumed to be quadratic with respect to the distance. That is, the
transport cost function is c(z) = cz2, where z is the distance from the consumer to the
seller, and c > 0 a multiplicative constant. Under this assumption, the development of
Hotelling’s model will be replayed following Hotelling’s original hypothesis — with the
exception of the transport cost function.
Let a and b be the locations of sellers A and B, respectively. In order to know the price
which maximizes the profit for both stores, the demand functions must be calculated. As
with Hotelling’s model, it is important to know where the indifferent consumer is located.
Let x be this point. At this case, assuming a < b, x ∈ [0, 1] will be indifferent if
pA + c|x− a|2 = pB + c|x− b|2. (2.10)
Observe that |x− a|2 = (x− a)2 = (a− x)2. Thus, equation (2.10) becomes









The indifferent consumer will be inside the market as long as x ∈ [0, 1]. That is,






and a simple manipulation yields to
c(a2 − b2) ≤ pB − pA ≤ c(b− a)(2− a− b).
So, if pB−pA satisfies the inequalities above, seller A will serve the market segment [0, x],
while seller B will serve the market segment [x, 1]. That is, qA = x and qB = 1− x.
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On the other hand, notice that if x > 1, that is, pB − pA > 2c(b− a) + c(a2− b2), then
we see that pB + c(1− b)2 > pA + c(1− a)2 and a consumer placed on 1 will prefer to buy
from A. Indeed,
pB + c(1− b)2 − pA − c(1− a)2
= pB − pA + c(b− a)(−2 + a+ b)
> c(b− a)(2− a− b) + c(b− a)(−2 + a+ b) = 0.
That is, pB + c(x− b)2 > pA + c(x− a)2 in the interval [0, 1], and so, demand for seller
A is all the market. That is, qA = 1 and qB = 0.
Finally, observe that if x < 0, that is, pB−pA < c(a2−b2), then for a consumer placed
at 0 we have
pB + c(0− b)2 − pA − c(0− a)2 = pB − pA + c(b2 − a2) < c(a2 − b2) + c(b2 − a2) = 0.
That is, pB + c(x− b)2 < pA + c(x−a)2 in the interval [0, 1]. Therefore, demand for seller
B is all the market. That is, qA = 0 and qB = 1.










if pB − c(b− a)(2− a− b) ≤ pA ≤ pB + c(b2 − a2),











if pA + c(a
2 − b2) ≤ pB ≤ pA + c(b− a)(2− a− b),
0 if pB > pA + c(b− a)(2− a− b).
In the case of quadratic transport cost function, πA and πB are continuous for all
pA, pB ∈ [0,∞). In addition, both πA and πB have a global maximum which corresponds
to the unique maximum of their quadratic piece — which is strictly concave. As a con-
sequence, there is only a unique Nash equilibrium. So that, for any fixed a and b, any
equilibrium point (p∗A, p
∗
B) must satisfy
c(a2 − b2) ≤ p∗B − p∗A ≤ c(b− a)(2− a− b).
With this information, let us calculate the pair of prices of the equilibrium point.
Taking first order conditions, 
∂πA
∂pA
(pA, pB) = 0
∂πB
∂pB
(pA, pB) = 0,
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(pA − c(2− a− b)(b− a)) .
(2.11)








(4− a− b)(b− a).
Observe that (p∗A, p
∗
B) is the Nash equilibrium that is true without any condition on
locations a and b, as long as a 6= b.
With the information above, let us investigate which the best location for each seller is

























(b− a)(4− a− b)2.




















(2 + a+ b)(2− a+ 3b).











if a, b ∈ [0, 1]. So locations that maximize profits must be on the extremes of the interval.
By hypothesis, a < b, so the best option is a = 0 and b = 1.
Doing the same process for πB we obtain the same result. Consequently, at any given
pair of locations, each seller gains an advantage from moving away as far as possible from
the other. That is, Hotelling’s model with quadratic transport costs implies exactly the
contrary of the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.
Chapter 3
Extension of Hotelling’s Model to
a Circle
One of the most remarkable variations of Hotelling’s model is Salop’s circle model,
which was introduced in 1979 by Salop in his article Monopolistic Competition with Out-
side Goods (see [17]). This locational model is similar to Hotelling’s one since it examines
consumer preference with regards to the geographic location. However, there exist two
significant differences: firms are located around a circle with no endpoints instead of a line
segment, and it allows consumers to choose a second heterogeneous good. Consumers have
the opportunity to purchase either one unit or none of this second product — according
to preferences, prices, and distribution of brands in product space — , and they spend the
rest of their income on a homogeneous good.
Since the circle model was introduced, it has been material of investigation. In partic-
ular, de Frutos, Hamoudi and Jarque (1999) [5], studies the existence of a unique perfect
equilibrium in the circle model with linear quadratic transport costs. In this work, below,
their analysis is adapted to validate the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a duopoly
circular model in the case of quadratic travel costs.
3.1 Circular Model With Quadratic Transport Costs
We are going to study the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a circular market with
quadratic transportation costs.
Let a, b ∈ [0, 1) be the location of sellers A and B, situated in a circular market
represented by a circumference of length 1. Notice that location 0 and 1 overlap. Without
loss of generality, we assume that seller A is located at a = 0, and seller B at b ∈ (0, 1/2].
Suppose that they sell a homogeneous good produced at zero cost. Let pA and pB denote,
respectively, the mill price of the product of sellers A and B.
A continuum of consumers are spread uniformly with unit density on the circumference.
Let us reuse the same assumption that each consumer buys one unit of the good from the
store with the lowest cost, considering both mill price and travel costs. In this case, travel
costs are assumed to be quadratic with respect to the distance. That is, the transport
cost function is c(z) = cz2, where z is the closest distance between the consumer and the
firm traveling along the perimeter of the circle, and c > 0 a multiplicative constant.
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Let qA and qB be the demand for sellers A and B, respectively. Recall that demand
for A is made by the proportion of consumers for whom buying from seller A is more
worthwhile (and the analogous applies to seller B). The market boundaries between stores
are determined by the indifferent consumers. So, to obtain the demand functions, we first
calculate the location of the indifferent consumers in the circle. Remember that the
location of an indifferent consumer, x ∈ [0, 1), is determined as follows:
pA + c|x− a|2 = pB + c|x− b|2. (3.1)
Depending on the value of pA and pB, and according to Figure 3.1, four different cases















1 = pB + c(x1 − b)2.








So, there will be an indifferent consumer in this region of the market if x1 ∈ [0, b],
that is,
−cb2 ≤ pA − pB ≤ cb2.
If pA−pB satisfies the inequalities above, consumers located to the right of x1 choose
seller A, whereas consumers to the left of x1 will buy from seller B.
(ii) Let x2 be the location of the indifferent consumer situated on [b, 1/2]. Similarly to
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Therefore, if x2 ∈ [b, 1/2], that is,
cb(b− 1) ≤ pA − pB ≤ −cb2,
there will be an indifferent consumer in this area of the market.
In this case, if pA − pB satisfies the inequalities above, consumers to the right of x2
will select firm A, and those located to the left of x2 will buy from seller B.
(iii) Let x3 be the location of the indifferent consumer situated on [1/2, b+ 1/2]. Recall
that location 1 and 0 overlap. Then, equation (3.1) becomes









There exists an indifferent consumer if x3 ∈ [1/2, b+ 1/2], that is,
cb(b− 1) ≤ pA − pB ≤ cb(1− b).
If pA − pB satisfies the inequalities above, those consumers located to the right of
x3 will buy from seller B, while those located to the left of x3 will select firm A.
(iv) Let x4 be the location of the indifferent consumer situated on [b + 1/2, 1]. In this
case, equation (3.1) changes into
pA + c(1− x4)2 = pB + c(1− x4 + b)2.








And x4 ∈ [b+ 1/2, 1] as long as
cb2 ≤ pA − pB ≤ cb(1− b).
If pA − pB satisfies the inequalities above, consumers to the left of x3 will buy from
seller A, while the remaining consumers select seller B.
We have seen that the location and the existence of indifferent consumers depends on
the value of pA − pB. Therefore, we have to study the following cases:
(a) If pA − pB < cb(b− 1), there is no indifferent consumer. Observe that
pA + c(b− 0)2 ≤ pB
since
pA − pB + cb2 < cb(b− 1) + cb2 = cb(2b− 1) ≤ 0.
So, even a consumer located at firm B prefers to buy the product from firm A. That
is, demand for seller A is all the market.
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(b) If cb(b − 1) ≤ pA − pB ≤ −cb2, then there are two indifferent consumers, x2 and x3.
In this case, demand for seller A is the group of consumers located to the right of x2
who travel to store A clockwise, plus the consumers located to the left of x3 travelling
to firm A counterclockwise. That is,







(c) If −cb2 ≤ pA − pB ≤ cb2, then there are two indifferent consumers, x1 and x3. Since
x1 equals x2, quantity demanded for seller A is the same as in the previous case.
(d) If cb2 ≤ pA − pB ≤ cb(1 − b), then there are two indifferent consumers, x3 and x4.
In this case, demand for seller A is the group of consumers located in [x3, x4], who
travel counterclockwise. That is,







(e) If pA − pB > cb(1− b), there is no indifferent consumer. Observe that
pA + c(b− 0)2 ≥ pB
since
pA − pB − cb2 > cb(1− b)− cb2 = cb(1− 2b) ≥ 0.
So, even a consumer located at firm A prefers to buy the product from firm B. That
is, demand for firm B is all the market, and so, demand for firm A is null.
Therefore, demand for seller A is determined. And we know that qB = 1 − qA. Conse-
quently, it is possible to define the profit functions as follows:
πA(pA, pB) =







if pB + cb(b− 1) ≤ pA ≤ pB + cb(1− b),










if pA + cb(b− 1) ≤ pB ≤ pA + cb(1− b),
0 if pB ≥ pA + cb(1− b).
It is easy to see that πA and πB are continuous for all pA, pB ∈ [0,∞).







A, pB) on [0,∞). Since πA and πB have their respective
maxima on their quadratic piece — which is strictly concave — , for any given b, they have
a unique global maximum. That is, there exists a unique pair of equilibrium prices. Let
us calculate it. Taking first order conditions,
∂πA
∂pA
(pA, pB) = 0
∂πB
∂pB
(pA, pB) = 0,
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we get the best response function{
pB = 2pA + cb(b− 1)
pA = 2pB + cb(b− 1),
from which we obtain the equilibrium point{
p∗A = cb(1− b)
p∗B = cb(1− b).













With the information above, let us compute which the best location of b is that maximizes

































is always negative, the profit maximizing location for seller B is b = 1/2. That is, each
seller benefits if firms are as far away as possible one from the other. In other words, if
firms are located opposite to each other on the circle.
Competition on Location but Not on Prices
Under the same assumptions, if we assume that sellers do not compete on price but
only on location, then the model is very simplified. That is, supposing that pA = pB,
equation (3.1) becomes
|x− a|2 = |x− b|2. (3.2)
In this case, there are two different possible locations of the indifferent consumers, x1 and
x2.
(i) Let x1 be the location of the indifferent consumer situated on [0, 1/2]. Assuming





(ii) Let x2 be the location of the indifferent consumer situated on [1/2, 1]. Assuming





Notice that x1 ∈ [0, 1/2] and x2 ∈ [1/2, 1] as long as 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. So, there always will be
two indifferent consumers. Therefore, demand for seller A will be




Consequently, qA = qB. That is, no matter the location of firm B, each seller gets half of
the market.
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Chapter 4
Location Games
Fournier and Scarsini, in 2019, in their article Location Games on Networks: Existence
and Efficiency of Equilibria (see [9] and [10]) extend a variation of Hotelling’s model to
graphs. They consider a game where a finite number of players sell a homogeneous product
at the same price to their consumers, who are uniformly distributed on a network. In
their model, sellers do not compete on price but only on location. They show that if the
number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a Nash equilibrium. Then, they
analyse how efficient the equilibria in location games are, using the Price of Anarchy and
the Price of Stability. They apply these results to some particular examples. We will focus
on the segment case — which was already studied previously by Eaton and Lipsey (1975)
[7] and Pálvölgyi (2011) [16], among others — , the star network, and the circle — also
considered by Eaton and Lipsey (1975) [7].
4.1 Existence of Equilibrium on a Segment
In this section, we study the existence of equilibrium on a segment when a finite
number of sellers do not compete on price but only on location.
As in Hotelling’s model, the market is represented by a line segment, which, without
loss of generality, is assumed to be [0, 1]. We consider that a finite number of firms
simultaneously choose a location where to operate within this interval. All firms produce
a unique homogeneous product which is charged at the same price. Let N = {1, . . . , n},
with n ≥ 2, denote the set of sellers and x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n the strategy profile
they play.
Consumers, represented by a mass of 1, are uniformly distributed along the unit in-
terval. Let us suppose that each customer buys one unit of this good per unit of time.
Because products are homogeneous and charged at the same price, transport costs are
the only aspect which consumers take into consideration when deciding from which seller
to buy. Therefore, each consumer decides to buy from the closest shop. If two or more
sellers are in the exact same location, then consumers meant to purchase at that location
are split equally between sellers. Firms seek to maximize their profits. The payoff of a
firm is equal to the mass of consumers it attracts.
Given a strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n, since it does not matter which firm
is in what location, we assume that player 1 is the leftmost point, and player n is the
rightmost point. That is, 0 ≤ x1 ≤· · · ≤ xn ≤ 1. Then, for each seller i ∈ N , we define
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d(0, x1) if i = 1,
1
2







d(xi, xi+1) if i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
d(xn, 1) if i = n.




















The above defined game is called location game on [0, 1] with n ≥ 2 players, and is denoted
by L (n, [0, 1]).
Given a strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [0, 1]n, we denote by x−i the (n − 1)
dimensional vector (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn). Given any z ∈ [0, 1] define
(z, x−i) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, z, xi+1, . . . , xn),
to allow for deviations of player i. Thus, a strategy profile x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the
game L (n, [0, 1]) if for all i ∈ N and for all xi ∈ [0, 1] we have
ρi(x
∗) ≥ ρi(xi, x∗−i).
We first state some general equilibrium properties.
Lemma 4.1. Let x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ [0, 1]n be a Nash equilibrium of L (n, [0, 1]). Then,
(a) There are no players on the extremes of the interval [0, 1], i.e., x∗i 6= 0 and x∗i 6= 1
for all i ∈ N.
(b) For every y ∈ [0, 1]
card{i : x∗i = y} ≤ 2.
(c) There exists ξ > 0 such that for all y ∈ [0, 1], if
card{i : x∗i = y} = 2,

















Proof. Suppose that x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium of L (n, [0, 1]), with n ≥ 2.
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(a) We show that there are no players placed on 0 nor 1. We focus on the extreme 0, but
the analogous arguments can apply to location 1.
First, we suppose that all players are located on 0. That is, there are no more firms
to the right of 0. In this case, players on 0 split the entire market amongst themselves
in equal parts — each gaining 1/n. If a firm located on 0 moves to z ∈ (0, 1) it will





for all z ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, a strategy profile where all players are located on 0 is not
a Nash equilibrium since any seller will increase profits by deviating to the right.
Now, we assume there are k < n players on 0. So, there is at least one player to the
right of 0. Let j be the closest seller to 0. Hence, the amount of consumers that buy
at 0 is 12d(0, x
∗




j ). Observe that, if k > 1,
1
2k







for all z ∈ (0, x∗j ). Thus, a seller i located on 0 will benefit from moving to z ∈ (0, x∗j ),
which means that x∗ is not an equilibrium strategy.




j ). Note that
1
2




for all z ∈ (0, x∗j ). So, the firm located on 0 will get a higher payoff if it moves
anywhere between (0, x∗j ). Therefore, there is not an equilibrium if there is only one
seller located at 0.
Consequently, there is no Nash equilibrium if any player is located at the extremes of
the interval [0, 1].
(b) We prove that only two firms can choose the same point in equilibrium. When n = 2
it is trivial. Thus, suppose that n ≥ 3 and assume, by contradiction, that there is a
point y ∈ (0, 1) with k ≥ 3 players. Let i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ k − 1 be the sellers located at
y.


















since d(x∗i , x
∗
i+1) = · · · = d(x∗i+k−2, x∗i+k−1) = 0.
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If we take ε < 2δ this deviation is profitable. That means that x∗ is not an equilibrium,
so k ≤ 2.
(c) We prove that all coupled firms of the game get the same payoff. Set n ≥ 2 and let
y ∈ [0, 1] be such that card{i : x∗i = y} = 2. Let i and i + 1 be the only two players
located at y. Since x∗i = x
∗






























































and then, one of the two sellers located at y could benefit by deviating a small amount
ε from y to the largest side, which contradicts that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium. So, each










We denote this amount by ξ(y).
Finally, we show that the ξ(y) does not depend on the location y. Suppose that
z ∈ [0, 1] is another location with two sellers. Without loss of generality, we suppose
that z is to the right of y. Let j and j + 1 be the sellers located at z. Reapplying the










We have to check that ξ(y) = ξ(z). Suppose, for example, that ξ(z) < ξ(y). This is
equivalent to ρj(x
∗) = ρj+1(x
∗) < ξ(y). In this case, seller j or j + 1 would deviate
to y − ε and win at least ξ(y) − ε/2, which is an improvement if ε is small enough.
So, x∗ would not be an equilibrium. The analogous argument applies if ξ(y) < ξ(z).
Hence, ξ(y) = ξ(z) and we can simply denote them by ξ.
(d) We show that on occupied locations nearest to the extremes of the interval there are
always two firms. Assume that the seller closest to an extreme of the interval is alone.
That contradicts the fact that x∗ is an equilibrium strategy because this firm could
increase its profit by moving away from the extreme, as long as it does not reach the
point where the next store is located.
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Now we state some necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategy profiles to be
Nash equilibria of the game L (n, [0, 1]).
Proposition 4.1. Let x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ [0, 1]n be a strategy profile of L (n, [0, 1]). The
following conditions characterize Nash equilibria for n 6= 3:
(i) x∗1 = x
∗
2 = 1− x∗n−1 = 1− x∗n.
(ii) x∗3 − x∗2 = x∗n−1 − x∗n−2 = 2x∗1.
(iii) For all i ∈ {3, . . . , n− 3}, x∗i+1 − x∗i ≤ 2x∗1.
(iv) For all i ∈ {3, . . . , n− 2}, x∗i+1 − x∗i−1 ≥ 2x∗1.
Proof. First, suppose that x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ [0, 1]n is a Nash equilibrium in L (n, [0, 1]).
We want to see that conditions (i) to (iv) are verified. We denote x∗1 = ξ > 0. Note that
conditions (i) and (ii) follow directly from Lemma 4.1(c) and (d).
Let us focus on condition (iii). Suppose, by contradiction, that there is at least one
i ∈ {3, . . . , n − 3} such that x∗i+1 − x∗i > 2ξ. Then, any of sellers 1, 2, n − 1 and n, that






Consequently, x∗ would not be a Nash equilibrium. Hence, condition (iii) must be true.
Now, we concentrate on condition (iv). Observe that, for i ∈ {3, . . . , n− 2}, if i is the





























Suppose, by contradiction, that x∗i+1 − x∗i−1 < 2ξ, which is equivalent to ρi(x∗) < ξ.
In this case, for ε small enough, firm i could improve its payoff by moving to x∗1 − ε,
which contradicts that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, for all i ∈ {3, . . . , n − 2},
x∗i+1 − x∗i−1 ≥ 2ξ. That is, condition (iv) is achieved.
So far, we have seen that any Nash equilibrium satisfies the conditions of the statement.
Now, we prove that if a strategy profile validates conditions above, then it is a Nash
equilibrium. That is, we show that any x̄ = (x̄1, . . . , x̄n) ∈ [0, 1]n which verifies conditions
(i) to (iv) does not allow any profitable deviation. If n ≤ 5, it is easy to check each
particular case. Note that we do not consider n = 3, since in this case conditions (i) and
(ii) cannot be true at the same time. From now on, we assume that n ≥ 6.
We observe that x̄1 > 0. Suppose, by contradiction, that x̄1 = 0. Then, from condition
(i) to (iii) it follows that all firms are located on 0. But, this contradicts (i) because
x̄n = 1− x̄1 = 1 6= 0. So, we denote x̄1 = µ > 0.
First, we show that at most 2 players can be in the exact same location. Let i be any
firm located at x̄i. By conditions (i) and (ii), it is obvious if i ∈ {1, 2, n − 1, n}. Thus,
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suppose i ∈ {3, . . . , n− 2} and, assume, by contradiction, that at least x̄i−1 = x̄i = x̄i+1.
By condition (iv), we know that x̄i+1 − x̄i−1 = 0 ≥ 2µ, but this contradicts that µ is
strictly positive. Therefore, there can only be one or two firms at an exact same point.
Now, we study the payoff of each firm. Let i ∈ N be any firm located at x̄i. If i is the






In addition, observe that if (iii) and (iv) are true, for any single firm i, we get
µ ≤ ρi(x̄) ≤ 2µ. (4.1)
On the other hand, we suppose that i shares location with another seller. From
conditions (i) and (ii) it follows that
ρ1(x̄) = ρ2(x̄) = ρn−1(x̄) = ρn(x̄) = µ.
Moreover, for any i ∈ {3, . . . , n− 3} such that x̄i = x̄i+1, we have that











Observe that, from conditions (iii) and (iv), for any i ∈ {3, . . . , n−3} such that x̄i = x̄i+1
we have
2µ ≤ x̄i+1 − x̄i−1 = x̄i − x̄i−1 ≤ 2µ,
which implies, in particular, that x̄i − x̄i−1 = 2µ. Similarly, we get that x̄i+2 − x̄i = 2µ
for any i ∈ {3, . . . , n− 3} such that x̄i = x̄i+1. So, equality (4.2) becomes
ρi(x̄) = ρi+1(x̄) = µ.
As a consequence, the payoff of any coupled firm i ∈ N is
ρi(x̄) = µ. (4.3)
Finally, we show that no firm can benefit by moving from its position. From (i)
we know that the distance between the extremes of the interval and the rightmost and
leftmost firms is µ. Furthermore, from (ii) and (iii), we know that the distance between
any two firms is no more than 2µ. So, if any firm i moves to any unoccupied location it
will get a payoff at most µ, which is not an improvement according to (4.1) and (4.3).
On the other hand, according to equation (4.3), if seller i moves to a location where
there is another firm, the payoff will be µ, which neither is an improvement. In addition,
since we have seen that only two firms can be at the exact same location, there are no
other options for firm i to change its position.
Hence, we have proved that if conditions (i) to (iv) are verified, none of the firms
can gain by moving from (x̄1, . . . , x̄n). As a consequence, the strategy profile x̄ is a Nash
equilibrium.
With all the information above, we analyse the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the
game based on the number of players.
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Theorem 4.1. Consider the game L (n, [0, 1]).
(a) For n = 2, 4, 5, there exists a unique (modulo permutation of players) Nash equilib-
rium.
(b) For n = 3, there is no Nash equilibrium.
(c) For n ≥ 6, there is an infinite number of Nash equilibria.
Proof. (a) It follows from conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4.1. When n = 2, the only
equilibrium is achieved when both sellers are located in the middle of the segment.
That is (x∗1, x
∗
2) = (1/2, 1/2). Figure 4.2 illustrates this situation.
If n = 4, then x∗1 = 1/4 is the only value that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of
Proposition 4.1. Therefore, the strategy profile (1/4, 1/4, 3/4, 3/4) is the unique Nash
equilibrium.
Finally, consider n = 5. Similar to the case above, x∗1 = 1/6 is the only option which
validates the required conditions. Consequently, (1/6, 1/6, 1/2, 5/6, 5/6) is the unique
Nash equilibrium.
(b) When n = 3, the only way to satisfy Lemma 4.1(d) is if all the firms are in the same
location. But this contradicts Lemma 4.1(a). As a consequence, it is impossible to
reach the equilibrium when there are three firms in the market.
(c) When n ≥ 6 there are infinite options that satisfy conditions (i) to (iv). Hence, there
is an infinite number of Nash equilibria. Let us construct equilibria to illustrate this.
We consider a strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ [0, 1]n which verifies conditions (i)
and (ii) of Proposition 4.1. That is, x∗ is such that x∗1 = x
∗
2 = 1 − x∗n−1 = 1 − x∗n
and x∗3 − x∗2 = x∗n−1 − x∗n−2 = 2x∗1. Let x∗1 = ξ > 0. We place the remaining sellers























Figure 4.1: Example of Nash equilibrium with n players.
Consequently, we have
6ξ + (n− 5)µ = 1. (4.4)
The strategy profile x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if conditions of Proposition
4.1 are satisfied. By construction, we know that (i) and (ii) are reached. From
condition (iii), it is necessary that µ ≤ 2ξ. On the other hand, from condition (iv),
µ ≥ ξ. Hence, we have
ξ ≤ µ ≤ 2ξ. (4.5)
Therefore, by (4.4) and (4.5), we get
1
2n− 4
≤ ξ ≤ 1
n+ 1
.
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Then, for every ξ satisfying inequalities above, the strategy profile x∗ is a Nash
equilibrium.
Let us represent some examples of Nash equilibria of L (n, [0, 1]).







2 = 1/20 1
2 players
Figure 4.2: Unique Nash equilibrium with 2 players.
Note that, the way to construct Nash equilibria for n ≥ 6 explained in the proof of
Theorem 4.1(c) does not consider all the possible equilibria, since all players are alone in
their location, apart from the sellers located closer to the extremes. Below, we study all
the Nash equilibria in the game L (n, [0, 1]) for n = 6.
Consider a strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
6) such that satisfies the conditions of
Preposition 4.1. Take ξ > 0, such that x∗1 = ξ. From conditions (i) and (ii), we have
x∗1 = x
∗
2 = 1− x∗5 = 1− x∗6 = ξ, and x∗3− x∗2 = x∗5− x∗4 = 2ξ. By µ, we denote the distance
between x∗3 and x
∗
















Figure 4.3: Nash equilibria with 6 players.
From condition (iii) we know that µ ≤ 2ξ, and from (iv), µ ≥ 0. That is,
0 ≤ µ ≤ 2ξ.
Since 6ξ + µ = 1, from inequalities above we have
1/8 ≤ ξ ≤ 1/6.
Consequently, the strategy profile (ξ, ξ, 3ξ, 1− 3ξ, 1− ξ, 1− ξ) for every ξ ∈ [1/8, 1/6]
is a Nash equilibrium of L (n, [0, 1]) when n = 6.
Note that, when ξ = 1/6, firms 3 and 4 are placed in the exact same location. On the
other hand, when ξ = 1/8, players 3 and 4 are as far apart as possible.
4.2 Existence of Equilibrium on a Star
Below, we study the existence of Nash equilibria in location games on a star when a
finite number of firms compete only on location.
We assume that the market is represented by a star network. Let Sk denote the
star, where k > 2 is its number of edges. That is, Sk is a network with k + 1 vertices
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{v0, v1, . . . , vk}, where for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, every vertex vj is connected to the central vertex,
v0, and to no other vertex. We assume that, for all j, the length of edges ev0vj is equal to





Figure 4.4: Star network S6.
We consider that a finite number of firms simultaneously choose a location where to
operate on the star — where there are numberless consumers uniformly distributed. Each
firm’s goal is to maximize their profits, and their payoff is equal to the mass of consumers
they attract. All firms supply a homogeneous product charged at the same price. Hence,
consumers will buy from the closest shop in order to minimize their transport costs. If
two or more sellers are in the exact same location, then consumers meant to purchase at
that location are split equally between sellers.
We denote by N = {1, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 2, the set of sellers. Each player chooses a
location in the star Sk, so the strategy space is S = S
n
k . A strategy profile is denoted by
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S. In order to simplify the model, since it does not matter which firm is




i ∈ N : xi ∈ ev0vj\{v0}
}
and call h(j) the cardinality of N j . Then, on each edge ev0vj\{v0}, we suppose that players
are ordered based on their position from v0, from the closest to the furthest. That is,
v0 < xj,1 ≤ xj,2 ≤· · · ≤ xj,h(j) ≤ vj , where xj,1 denotes the location of the player closest
to v0 in the edge ev0vj , and so on until xj,h(j), which represents the location of the furthest
player. Therefore, if a firm i is not located on v0 it can be referred as player (j,m), where
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} indicates the edge where it is located and m ∈ {1, . . . , h(j)} its position on
this edge.
Given a strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S, in order to define the payoff of each





d(v0, xj,1) if there is at least one player on ev0vj ,
1 otherwise.
The payoff of any firm depends on whether it is located in the central vertex or not,
as well as on whether — according to the strategy profile x— there is a player located in
v0 or not. So, we distinguish between the following cases:
(a) The strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S is such that there is at least one player in
v0. Then,
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(i) Payoff of players i ∈ N such that xi = v0 is
ρi(x) =
1









d(xj,m−1, xj,m) for m ∈ {1, . . . , h(j)},






d(xj,m, xj,m+1) if m ∈ {1, . . . , h(j)− 1},
d(xj,h(j), vj) if m = h(j).
Then, payoff of players located in ev0vj\{v0} is
ρj,m(x) =
1










(b) The strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ S is such that there is no player in v0. Then,
the player closest to v0 may attract some consumers from other edges. For the purpose
of our study, it is not necessary to specify the payoff of the firms in this situation.
The information above defines a game called location game on Sk. We denote it by
L (n, Sk). Recall that a strategy profile x
∗ ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium of the game L (n, Sk)
if for all i ∈ N and for all xi ∈ Sk we have
ρi(x









i+1, . . . , x
∗
n).
Below, we describe some properties which are verified for any Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 4.2. Let x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ S be a Nash equilibrium of L (n, Sk). Then,
(a) There exists i ∈ N such that x∗i = v0.
(b) There are no players on the extremes of the edges, i.e., for all i ∈ N and for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, x∗i 6= vj .
(c) For every y ∈ Sk\{v0}
card{i : x∗i = y} ≤ 2.
(d) card{i : x∗i = v0} ≤ k.
(e) If for some i ∈ N, we have x∗i ∈ Sk\{v0}, then for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, there are at
least two players (j, h(j)− 1), (j, h(j)) ∈ N j such that x∗j,h(j)−1 = x
∗
j,h(j).
Proof. Suppose that x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium of L (n, Sk).
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(a) Suppose, by contradiction, that x∗i 6= v0 for all i ∈ N. If there is any edge with
no firms, the seller located furthest from the center will improve his or her payoff
by moving to v0. Moreover, if there are edges with just one player, the firms that
are alone on their respective edges benefit from moving closer to the center. So, we
assume that x∗ is such that there are at least two firms on each edge. Note that, if
d(v0, x
∗
j,1) is the same amount for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then for any j, the firm (j, 1)
benefits from moving towards v0, since it will gain customers from all other edges.
Thus, suppose now, there is at least one player located nearest to the center than the
others. Take (ĵ, 1) one of the firms closest to v0. Observe that player (ĵ, 1) attracts
customers from all edges such that d(xĵ,1) < d(xj,1) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In addition,
if firm (ĵ, 1) moves by ε to v0, it will gain ε/2 from all ev0vj such that j 6= ĵ. Therefore,
if firm (ĵ, 1) moves towards the center, its payoff increases, since the amount it loses
from consumers in its own edge is less than the gains from consumers coming from
all other edges. In any case, x∗ cannot be a Nash equilibrium, and therefore, there
must be at least on player located in v0.
(b) The argument is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1(a).
(c) The argument is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1(b).















Therefore, for ε > 0 small enough, if a firm located in v0 moves by ε to the edge ev0vĵ ,
with ĵ such that maxj∈{1,...,k} pj(x
∗) = pĵ(x
∗), it will get a higher payoff. That means
that x∗ is not an equilibrium, and so k′ ≤ k.
(e) Suppose that there exists i ∈ N such that x∗i ∈ ev0vj\{v0}. We show that there are at
least two coupled firms on each edge. First, we observe that seller i cannot be alone









Hence, player i would get a higher payoff moving towards the center. This contradicts
that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium and, therefore, there must be at least 2 players on
ev0vj\{v0}. Furthermore, note that there are no empty edges — if this were the case,
for any player located on an edge, it would be worthwhile to move to the empty edge,
close enough to v0.
On the other hand, using a similar argument to that used to prove Lemma 4.1(d), we
know that all players who are the furthest from the center, on each edge, are in pairs.
Now, we determine the payoff of all sellers that share location with at least another
firm under a strategy profile. First, we focus on players located on an edge and then, on
players placed in the center. In particular, we will see that all the firms that are not alone
get the same payoff. We denote by ξ this amount.
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Lemma 4.3. Let x∗ be a Nash equilibrium of L (n, Sk), and let y ∈ ev0vj\{v0} be such
that
card{i : x∗i = y} = 2.
Let (j,m) and (j,m+ 1) be the two players in y. We have
























j,m+1, vj) = ξ(y).
(c) The value ξ(y) does not depend on y (hence, we simply denote it ξ).
Proof. It follows by a similar argument to that used in the proof of Lemma 4.1(c).







Proof. Consider a Nash equilibrium x∗ such that card{i : x∗i = v0} = k. Then, each of





∗) is the same amount for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If this was not the case,










Let ĵ be such that maxj∈{1,...,k} pj(x
∗) = pĵ(x
∗). Then, one of the firms located in v0
would improve its payoff by moving towards vĵ by ε > 0 small enough.
Suppose, now, that there exists a location y that satisfies conditions from Lemma 4.3,







Suppose, by contradiction, that ξ > (
∑k
j=1 pj(x
∗))/k. Then, for ε small enough, any firm
located in v0 could increase its payoff by moving to y−ε since it would gain ξ. On the other
hand, suppose that ξ < (
∑k
j=1 pj(x
∗))/k, which leads to ξ < maxj∈{1,...,k} pj(x
∗). Let ĵ
be such that maxj∈{1,...,k} pj(x
∗) = pĵ(x
∗). Then any player located in y could improve
by moving to ev0vĵ closer to v0. Both cases contradicts that x
∗ is a Nash equilibrium, so
payoff of players in the center must be equal to ξ.
Below, we study the existence of Nash equilibria in L (n, Sk) depending on the number
of players in the game.
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Theorem 4.2. Consider a location game L (n, Sk).
(a) If 2 ≤ n ≤ k, a unique equilibrium x∗ exists where x∗i = v0 for all i ∈ N.
(b) If k < n < 3k − 1, there is no Nash equilibrium.
(c) If 3k − 1 ≤ n ≤ 3k, there exists a unique equilibrium.
(d) If 3k + 1 ≤ n, there exists an infinite number of equilibria.
Proof. (a) Suppose 2 ≤ n ≤ k. When all players are located on v0, each seller gets a
payoff equal to k/n ≥ 1. On the other hand, if any firm i, located on v0, moved to
any point x ∈ ev0vj\{v0} its payoff would be
1
2
d(v0, xj,1) + d(xj,1, vj),
which is strictly less than 1 because of d(v0, vj) = 1. Hence, a strategy profile x
∗ ∈ Sk
such that x∗i = v0 for all i ∈ N is a Nash equilibrium of L (n, Sk). Now, we prove
its uniqueness. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists an equilibrium such that
there is at least one i ∈ N such that x∗i ∈ ev0vj\{v0}. Consequently, by Lemma 4.2(d),
there must be at least 2 players on each edge, and so there should be at least n ≥ 2k
players, which contradicts n ≤ k.
(b) Assume k < n < 3k−1, we show that it is not possible to place sellers in an equilibrium
strategy profile. Suppose, by contradiction, that x∗ ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium. By
Lemma 4.2(a), there exists at least one player i ∈ N such that x∗i = v0. In addition,
by Lemma 4.2(c), at most k players can be in v0. Since k < n, then there must be
at least one seller on an edge. From Lemma 4.2(d) it follows that there are at least
two coupled firms on each edge. Therefore, if k < n < 2k + 1, x∗ can not be a Nash
equilibrium.
Thus, suppose now that 2k + 1 ≤ n < 3k + 1 and that there are 2 coupled sellers on
each edge. Observe that the remaining n − 2k players must be located in v0. If this
was not true, we would have more than 2 firms in at least one edge, and so, according
to Lemma 4.3,
1 = d(v0, vj) = d(v0, x
∗
j,1) +· · ·+ d(x∗j,h(j)−3, x
∗
j,h(j)−2) + 3ξ. (4.6)
However, since there are at most k − 2 remaining players, we have that there is at
least one edge with only 2 coupled players. Consequently,




j,2, vj) = 3ξ
which contradicts (4.6).













By Lemma 4.3 we know that coupled players on edges gain ξ. Note that if one firm
on an edge moves to v0 will get a payoff of
kξ
n− 2k + 1
,
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which is larger than ξ as long as n < 3k − 1. Therefore, there is no Nash equilibrium
if k < n < 3k − 1.
(c) If n ∈ {3k − 1, 3k}, it is easy to prove that a strategy profile x∗ where there are
2 players on each edge, both located at a distance 2/3 from v0, and the remaining
players located on the central vertex, is a Nash equilibrium. Let us prove that it is
the only existing equilibrium. According to Lemma 4.2, we know where 2k + 1 firms
must be located for x∗ to be an equilibrium: one on v0 and two on each edge. Then,
there are k − 2 remaining players if n = 3k − 1, and k − 1 if n = 3k. Consequently,
using the same argument to that of case (b), there is at least one edge with only 2
firms, and so, the only way for x∗ to be an equilibrium is that all remaining players
are in v0. Moreover, since n ≥ 3k − 1 no firm can increase its payoff by changing
position. Hence, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
(d) Suppose n ≥ 3k + 1. We construct a strategy profile x∗ with m players on each edge
and r players in the center, assuming that the disposition of players is the same in all
k edges. Let n = ak+ b be the Euclidean division of n by k. If b 6= 0, then m = a and
r = b. If b = 0, m = a−1 and r = k. Note that, since n ≥ 3k+ 1, there always will be
at least 3 players on each edge. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we allocate the two furthest
players from v0 at distance ξ from vj , that is, d(xj,m−1) = d(xj,m, vj) = ξ. We place the
remaining sellers individually such that the distance between two consecutive players
on edges is 2ξ. Assume µ = d(v0, xj,1). Consequently, we have (2m−3)ξ+µ = 1. The
following figure clarifies this scenario:












Figure 4.5: Strategy profile x∗ on S3.
Let us determine the payoff of players in each possible position:
























∗) = 2ξ, ρi(x
∗) = ξ,
depending on whether x∗i is such that d(v0, x
∗








i+1) = 2ξ or
d(x∗i , vj) = ξ, respectively.
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The strategy profile x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if no player can get a higher payoff by
moving from its location. That is, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if an only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) No player has an incentive to move to an unoccupied location. If a firm moved
from its position, its payoff would be µ/2, ξ or ξ−ε/2 with ε ∈ (0, ξ), depending
on whether the length of the interval is µ, 2ξ or ξ, respectively. Thus, for all




≥ ξ and µ ≤ 2ξ.
(ii) No player is incentivized to move to v0. By construction, we know that ρi(x
∗) ≥ ξ
for all i ∈ N such that x∗i 6= v0. On the other hand, ρi(x∗) = kµ/2r for all i ∈ N




(iii) No player can gain by moving to an occupied location on the edges. If a firm
occupies a location where there is at least another firm, its payoff will be µ/4 +
ξ/2, ξ or 2ξ/3 (depending on the chosen location). Thus, if inequalities of (i)
and (ii) are verified, no player would have an incentive to do so.
From conditions above we have that
k
2(r + 1) + 2km− 3k
≤ ξ ≤ k
2r + 2km− 3k
. (4.7)
Then, for every ξ satisfying (4.7), the strategy profile x∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Hence, the game has an infinite number of Nash equilibria.
Let us illustrate some examples of the Nash equilibria explained above. To represent
any star Sk, we consider a star with 6 edges.
2/3 1/3 2/5 2/5 1/5
1 player 2 players k − 1 players
Figure 4.6: Left: equilibrium with 3k− 1 players. Right: equilibrium with 4k− 1 players.
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4.3 Existence of Equilibrium on a Circle
In this section, we look into the scenario when firms do not compete on prices but only
on location in a circle. Particularly, we analyze the existence of Nash equilibria when a
finite number of sellers choose a location in a unit circle.
Consider a circular market of length 1, C = [0, 1), where there are a finite number
of players that simultaneously choose a location for their store. All sellers supply a
homogeneous product which is charged at the same mill price. Let N = {1, . . . , n}, with
n ≥ 2, be the set of players and x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C n the strategy they play.
We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed along the unit circle, and we
suppose that each customer buys one unit of the product from the closest firm. If two
or more sellers are in the exact same location, then consumers meant to purchase in
that location are split equally between sellers. The payoff of each firm is the number of
consumers it attracts.
Given a strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C n, we suppose that player 1 is the seller
nearest to 0 (counterclockwise), and seller n the one closest to 1 (clockwise). Recall that
location 0 and 1 overlap. In other words, 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn < 1. Then, for each player













where x0 := xn and xn+1 := x1.
As a consequence, given a strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C n, the payoff of a player
i ∈ N is
ρi(x) =
1










The above information defines a location game on a unit circle. Let us denote it by
L (n,C ).
Recall that a strategy profile x∗ ∈ C n is a Nash equilibrium of the game L (n,C ) if
for all i ∈ N and for all xi ∈ C we have
ρi(x









i+1, . . . , x
∗
n).
Note that location games on a circle do not differ too much from location games on a
segment. The main difference is that on the circle there are no endpoints. Thus, doing
a similar analysis to that of the previous sections, we know that some of the conditions
which are needed for a strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium are also true. For example,
at most 2 firms can be in the exact same location, and all coupled firms of the game get
the same payoff.
Nevertheless, in this section, we focus on demonstrate that for each n ≥ 2, there always
is an equilibrium in the game L (n,C ). To do so, we first construct two different strategy
profiles and then we prove that they are indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Below, we define possible strategy profiles of the game L (n,C ) as follows:
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, for all i ∈ N.
(ii) Let x̂ be the strategy profile such that the distance between two consecutive locations
is always the same. Whenever possible, players are placed in pairs. So, if n is even,
all players are coupled. If n is odd, all players are in pairs except one. That is,
x̂2i−1 = x̂2i =
2i
n
, i ∈ {1, . . . , bn/2c}; 1 x̂n = 1, if bn/2c 6= n/2.
Lemma 4.5. The strategy profiles x̄ and x̂ are equilibria of L (n,C ).
Proof. Let us consider each strategy profile separately.
(i) Under the strategy profile x̄, firms are placed individually such that d(x̄i, x̄i+1) = 1/n











Observe that if a firm i deviates to any unoccupied location, it would get a payoff
of 1/2n. As a consequence, no movement to any interval between two players is
profitable. Furthermore, if a firm i moved to a location where there is another
player, its payoff would be either 3/4n or 1/2n, depending on whether this player is
or is not a consecutive player. In either case, the payoff is smaller than 1/n, and so
it neither is beneficial. Thus, x̄ is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Under the strategy profile x̂, we should differentiate two different cases: n even and
n odd.
When n is even, in all occupied location there are 2 players. So, distance between





If a firm i moves to an unoccupied location it will get a payoff at most 1/n, which is
not an improvement. On the other hand, if a firm i moves to an occupied location,
its payoff will become 2/3n, which neither is profitable. As a result, x̂ is a Nash
equilibrium for n even.
On the other hand, if n id odd, all players are coupled except one. We assume










1The floor function b·c : R → Z defined by bxc = max{m ∈ Z | m ≤ x} gives the largest integer less
than or equal to x.
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It is obvious that the single firm would not benefit from changing its location. As
per the coupled sellers, if one moves to an unoccupied location or joins the single
seller, it will get a payoff of 1/(n + 1), which is not an improvement. Finally, if a
coupled seller decides to occupy a location where there is already a pair of players,
the payoff will be 2/3(n+ 1), which is not profitable. As a consequence, x̂ is a Nash
equilibrium.
Finally, with the information above, we are able to prove that for n ≥ 2 the game
L (n,C ) has always a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2. For every n ≥ 2, the set of equilibria of the game L (n,C ) is nonempty.
Proof. Since for any n ≥ 2 players can be located according to one of the strategy profiles
defined above, it is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.5.
The following figure illustrates an example of Nash equilibrium for each of the strategy
profiles explained above. For instance, we consider the game L (6,C ).
1 player 2 players
Figure 4.7: Left: equilibrium x̄ with 6 players. Right: equilibrium x̂ with 6 players.
Chapter 5
Efficiency of Nash Equilibria
Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games do not always represent the most desirable
outcomes for all economic agents involved, due to the fact that each agent plays in a
selfish way. When this happens, we say that Nash equilibria are not efficient.
Let us review some examples of inefficient Nash equilibria.
To begin with, recall the Prisoners’ Dilemma described in Example 1.1. As we men-
tioned in Example 1.2, the outcome of the game’s Nash equilibrium is worse for each
player (each prisoner spends more years in jail) than it would have been if they had made
a non-selfish decision. Hence, the unique Nash equilibrium in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
game is inefficient since there is another outcome that is preferred by all players.
Regarding the location games studied in previous chapters, recall that firms’ goal is to
maximize profits, whereas consumers want to minimize travelled distances. Note that any
strategy profile produces the same total payoff for sellers. Therefore, from sellers’ point
of view, Nash equilibria in location games are efficient. However, these Nash equilibria
may not be the best outcome for consumers, since there could be some strategy profiles
that decrease travel costs. From consumers’ point of view, therefore, Nash equilibria are
not always desirable.
This inefficiency of Nash equilibria in location games may explain why governments
regulate the location of some business, such as pharmacies. For example, in Barcelona,
the location of a new drugstore must be at a distance of at least 250 meters from the
nearest existing one.
Let us study some particular examples. First, consider the location game on a segment
with 2 firms. As we have seen in Theorem 4.1, the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium
which is reached when both firms are located in the middle of the segment. That is, if
x1 and x2 represents the location of firm 1 and firm 2 in the unit segment respectively,
then the strategy profile (x1, x2) = (1/2, 1/2) is the Nash equilibrium. Consequently, each
firm gets half of the market. Observe that firms would get the same payoff if they were
located such that (x1, x2) = (1/4, 3/4). If this was the case, total consumers’ travelling
costs — called social costs — would be lower. Therefore, Nash equilibrium is inefficient
from consumers’ point of view.
More specifically, when both players are located in the middle of the segment, the
total social cost is 1/4. Instead, when players are located such that (x1, x2) = (1/4, 3/4),
the total social cost is 1/8. So, as we stated before, the second strategy profile is more
desirable for costumers, although it is not a Nash equilibrium.
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The following figure illustrates the two strategy profiles mentioned above. The total











1 player 2 players
Figure 5.1: Left: (x1, x2) = (1/2, 1/2). Right (x1, x2) = (1/4, 3/4).
Recall now, the location game on a segment with 6 players. By Theorem 4.1, we know
that the game has infinite Nash equilibria. In addition, at the end of Section 4.1, we have
seen that the strategy profile
x = (ξ, ξ, 3ξ, 1− 3ξ, 1− ξ, 1− ξ)
for ξ ∈ [1/8, 1/6] determines all possible equilibria in L (6, [0, 1]). From sellers’ perspective,
all possibilities are equally profitable. However, this does not apply to consumers. Let us
study which is the best option for them.
First of all, we represent any strategy profile x throughout the following figure. We




ξ 3ξ 1− 3ξ 1− ξ
1 player
Figure 5.2: x = (ξ, ξ, 3ξ, 1− 3ξ, 1− ξ, 1− ξ).
Observe that, when ξ = 1/8, the triangle in the centre is sized as the triangles on its
side. In addition, it disappears when ξ = 1/6, since 3ξ = 1 − 3ξ. In any case, the total
social cost is given by
C(ξ) = 12ξ2 − 3ξ + 1/4
for all ξ ∈ [1/8, 1/6]. Note that C has a global minimum when ξ = 1/8. Hence, from
consumers’ point of view, (1/8, 1/8, 3/8, 5/8, 7/8, 7/8) is the best equilibrium. On the
other hand, the strategy profile (1/6, 1/6, 1/2, 1/2, 7/6, 7/6) is their worst equilibrium.
Rather than wanting to reduce travel costs, there are stuations in which players aim to
reduce travel time. It is interesting to study the agents’ behaviour in these games when
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they operate freely. Again, due to individuals acting selfishly when deciding their travel
plans, the outcome of the game’s Nash equilibria may not be the optimal for the entire
set of consumers. This behaviour is explained by the Braess’ paradox (see [2]), which
illustrates situations in which adding roads to a traffic network can increase travel times.
Braess’ paradox has applications in several fields, such as electricity or telecommunication
networks.
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